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Cognitive radio offers a flexible and efficient utilization of radio frequency resources by dynamic spectrum sharing as 
required in next gen (5G) architecture of wireless communication. The channel allocation time, probability of false alarm 
detection and spectral efficiency are the major performance parameters to characterize a spectrum sharing technique. This 
paper presents modified energy detection based dynamic channel allocation technique based on sensing the power spectral 
density of idle spectrum bands i.e. spectrum hole. Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves have been used to 
analyze the detector performance of sensing with respect to probability false alarm at different values of SNR. Allocation of 
unoccupied bands to the SUs has been done by coalition based cooperative game, which provides SUs with an 
incentive to cooperate. Based on their worth, SUs get payoffs which have been computed using Shapely values as a 
one-point solution. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction mechanism has been used to allocate the spectrum 
resources fairly to each user. On the basis of allocation time, the present model for dynamic spectrum access appears to be 
more efficient as compared to the conventional opportunistic spectrum access model.  
Keywords: Cognitive radio, Dynamic spectrum access, Spectrum sharing, WARP, Cooperative game, Shapley values, 
VCG auction 
1 Introduction 
Cognitive radio, a recent innovation by J. Mitola
1
, 
has emerged as a promising solution to be focused for 
improved utilization of radio resources to cater the 
growing demand of diverse wireless applications in 5G 
scenario. The conventional static spectrum allocation 
policies have created considerable under-utilization of 
spectral bands in time, space and frequency domain. 
The idle period of a spectrum band referred to as white 
spaces or spectrum holes, offer great opportunity to 
share spectrum among licensed and unlicensed users to 
cater the spectrum scarcity. To ensure the rational, fair 
and economical usage of the spectrum, relevant 
government authorities all over the globe have issued 
spectrum allocation reforms policies which allow 
unlicensed or secondary users (SUs) to dynamically 
access the unused licensed spectrum bands, provided 
that they do not cause harmful interference to the 
licensed or primary users (PUs)
2
. The Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT), Govt. of India, has also 
notified the spectrum sharing rules, which allows the 
sharing of presently available spectrum and the 
additional frequency bands allocated in future. DoT 
guidelines for 5G trials across all available spectrum 
bands and is likely to allocate up to 400 MHz of radio 
waves for the purpose
3
. 
Conventionally, in wireless communication 
terminology, spectrum sharing is authorized 
utilization of the same span of frequencies by two or 
more user wireless applications on a non-exclusive 
basis in a defined sharing arrangement
4
. The original 
standard spectrum sharing architecture is 
Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA), wherein the 
PU and the SU have mutual exclusive access to the 
spectrum. The SU can access the spectrum only when 
PU is not using that portion of spectrum, which means 
that SU relies on sensing the spectrum to detect the 
presence or absence of available primary user signal 
on the frequency band. Although OSA has great 
potential to enhance the spectrum utilization to fullest, 
however the re-emergence of a PU signal may cause 
arbitrary disruption to SU and may result in highly 
unstable and unpredictable performance and poor 
quality of service (QoS) for SU’s communication. 
Such limitations of OSA could be addressed by 
managing spectrum sharing between SUs and PUs 
dynamically using cognitive radios
5
. The limited 
available spectrum and the inefficient spectrum usage 
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have brought in a new communication paradigm to 
exploit the existing wireless spectrum opportunistically 
and is referred to as Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) 
and cognitive radio networks (CRN)
6
.  
The CRN allows wireless communication system 
to rely on so-called cognitive cycle. The cognitive 
capability of CR i.e. ability to sense and identify the 
idle portions of the spectrum in time and space and 
re-configurability to adjust the software as per the 
result of spectrum sensing, are the key features to 
facilitate sharing of specific band of radio spectrum 
between licensed PUs with other opportunistic 
cognitive user or SUs without causing harmful 
interferences to PUs. In CRN, spectrum sharing
7
 
involves four steps as depicted in Fig. 1.  
The first step of spectrum sharing is to sense the 
spectrum holes. Cognitive user (or SU) constantly 
detects the portions of spectrum, which are in use by 
PUs in time, space and frequency domain. Once the 
precise detection of spectrum holes is accomplished, 
the next step is to distribute or allocate the available 
band to SUs. An efficient spectrum access is the third 
key requirement to coordinate among SUs and PUs. 
The fourth step, spectrum handoff governs the 
working and switching of PU and the mobility of SUs 
to avoid latency or collision between them.  
Classical spectrum sensing approaches are energy 
detection, matched filtering detection, and 
cyclostationary detection, where the spectrum 
sensing algorithms are based on the user's transmitter 
signal
8
. Such algorithms have the advantages 
of high technology maturity, low design difficulty, 
and easy realization. Matched filtering is a correlation 
based approach whereas in cyclostationary method 
considers cyclic features of the transmitter signal. 
Energy detection (ED) method relies on estimating 
the power of each frequency of the signal (Power 
Spectral Density, PSD) and results can be presented 
as periodogram or Welch periodogram. Among 
different methods reported in literature ED method is 
simple to realize hence most popular signal detection 
method in practical implementation. 
A comprehensive overview on spectrum 
management needs to be considered to fulfill the next 
generation requirements of spectrum in cognitive 
radio wireless networks. The network architecture 
for spectrum sharing can be centralized or distributed. 
In centralized networks, a central entity controls 
the spectrum allocation and access procedure, 
accordingly a spectrum allocation map is constructed; 
whereas in distributed (de-centralized) networks, 
each node is responsible for spectrum allocation and 
access is based on local policies. On the basis of 
spectrum allocation behavior, the spectrum sharing 
approach can be non-cooperative or cooperative. The 
non-cooperative spectrum allocation is a ‘selfish’ 
approach, where the impact of one secondary 
node/user’s activity on other secondary nodes is not 
considered. In cooperative approach, each SU 
consider its own spectrum requirement, along with its 
interference and influence on other SUs present in the 
system network. The interference measurement of 
each secondary node/ user is shared among other 
nodes. This localized operation provides an effective 
balance between a centralized and a distributed 
architecture. Further on the basis of spectrum 
access, the system may follow overlay, underlay 
or hybrid approach
9
. In overlay approach, 
SU transmit with different power levels within 
spectrum holes in accordance with the power level of 
PU. The underlay approach allows PUs and SUs to 
transmit simultaneously. The SU transmits at lower 
power by enforcing a spectral mask so that the 
interference temperature by the SU is below the 
acceptable level of interference to PU. The hybrid 
spectrum sharing (HSS) is a sensing-based spectrum 
sharing approach where SU adapt the transmission 
power based on sensing the PU's transmit power. If 
the PU is detected to be absent, the SU can access the 
primary band with a higher transmit power; 
otherwise, it will transmit at a lower power. Numbers 








, and Dinkelbach's method
 
based 
iterative power allocation algorithm
15
 for energy-
efficient spectrum sharing. An ergodic capacity of 
SU link under joint transmit and interference power 
constrain has also been used for sensing based 
spectrum sharing
16
. A low complexity algorithm Fig. 1 — Spectrum Sharing Paradigm in CRN 
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based on graph-theory and mixed integer coding is 
proposed for underlay spectrum sharing paradigm
17
.  
Essential features of spectrum sharing are 
coexistence of PUs and SUs, fairness in spectrum 
access, optimum utilization of spectrum, low 
switching cost, realistic implementation and 
interference resolution mechanism. Accordingly 
various spectrum allocation approaches based on 
mathematical theories or microeconomics including 
Graph based, Auction based, and Game Theory based 
models have emerged
18
. In recent years, there has 
been a significant growth in research activities that 
use game theory
19
 for analyzing communication 
networks as it provides a formal analytical framework 
with a set of mathematical tools to study the complex 
interactions among users/players. Thus we are 
equipped with various optimality criteria for spectrum 
sharing. In concordance with the spectrum allocation 
approaches, the game theoretical approach in-general 
can be modeled as a non-cooperative or cooperative 
in CRNs. The non-cooperative game theory, studies 
the strategic choices of the competing users who 
choose their own independent strategy to improve 
their own performance or utility. The cooperative 
game takes into account the interactions among the 
users, making the spectrum sharing more efficient and 
fair. Although, the payoff of non-cooperative game is 
lower than that of cooperative game model, however 
the spectrum utilization efficiency is higher in 
cooperative approach. For stable sharing, the game 
theory aims to reach steady state i.e. a stable point at 
which no player (i.e. users) can change their strategy; 
concept of ‘Nash equilibrium’ is used in non-
cooperative games whereas ‘Core’ is solution concept 
for cooperative game. Fairness in allocation can be 
achieved using one of the ‘one-point solutions’ such 
as Shapely values that lie within the core
20,21
. 





 based non-cooperative game 
model have been reported for spectrum allocation. 
A cooperative approach using stochastic geometry 
theory
24
 has been used for spectrum sharing between 
cellular and ad-hoc networks, wherein the 
transmission capacity of the ad-hoc network and the 





 hybrid approach is 
proposed for spectrum sharing, where SUs switch 
their transmission mode between underlay and 
overlay based on the second-order statistics of the 
primary links in a cooperative architecture. Saad et al.
26
 
have simulated a cooperative game theoretic model 
for joint spectrum sensing and access in CRNs. 
The game is modelled in partition form where SUs 
make individual distributed decisions to join or leave 
the coalition, while maximizing their utilities. 
Rajasekharan et al.
27
 have simulated spectrum sharing 
in CRNs where SUs sense the spectrum cooperatively 
to access unoccupied spectrum bands and VCG 
auction mechanism is followed for fair allocation. For 
CR based communication paradigm, it is important to 
demonstrate the simulated model on a fully working 
over-the-air implementation testbeds. Testbed speed 
up the simulation and provide experimental validation 
of model in real time. Reports on implementation of 
spectrum sensing models employing different CR 
testbeds
28-31
 offer significant contribution over just 
theoretical studies. 
Based on this motivation, the paper presents a 
cooperative game theory based modified approach to 
address the spectrum sensing and allocation as a 
joint model for spectrum sharing in CRNs and its 
real time implementation on WARP to evaluate the 
performance in terms of spectral efficiency, channel 
allocation time and probability of false alarm.  
2 Cooperative game based spectrum sharing 
approach 
In communication networks, the spectrum sensing is 
a stage during which SUs attempt to understand the 
communication environment prior to the spectrum 
access stage when the SUs actually transmit their data, 
thus SUs are subjected to a trade-off between sensing 
and access when the SUs seek to improve both the 
aspects. Therefore, an overall joint framework on 
spectrum sensing and allocation as a cooperative game 
appears an achievable solution for efficient spectrum 
sharing in CRNs. A brief theoretical background of the 
spectrum sharing model used in present study is given 
in following sub-sections. 
2.1 Spectrum sensing 
The Neyman-Pearson (NP) criteria is being used to 
compare the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) with a 
predetermined threshold, for implementing the energy 
detection technique as shown in
8
 :  
log 
 𝑃 𝑥0 ,𝑥1,𝑥2 …..𝑥 𝑁−1   𝐻1 





λ ... (1) 
where,  𝑃 𝑥  𝐻1  and  𝑃 𝑥  𝐻0  are probability
density function of binary hypothesis H1 (PU present) 
and H0 (PU absent) respectively. The log likelihood 
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ratios are translated to the probability of detection 
(PD) of PU. The sensing is based on comparing the 
test statistics, T (based on average power of the 
received signal, 𝑥𝑛
2) with threshold; if threshold
exceeds it is decided that hypothesis H1 is true 
otherwise hypothesis H0. The signal-to-noise (SNR) 
ratio of the received signal can be expressed as (2) 
when 𝜎𝑥
2 and 𝜎𝑤




2   ... (2)
The threshold (λ) is calculated using the principle 
of constant false alarm rate as,  
𝜆 = 𝑄−1(𝑃𝐹𝐴 2𝑁 + 𝑁) 𝜎𝑤
2  ... (3) 
where, Q is standard Gaussian complementary 
cumulative distribution function (CCDF), N is the 
number of signal samples and PFA is probability of 
false alarm. The efficiency of detection method 
depends on the accuracy of the threshold. Decision 
statics combined with SNR are translated to 
probability of detecting PU and these results are used 
in next step of cooperative game for spectrum 
allocation.  
2.2 Spectrum allocation using game theory 
A cooperative game (N,v) is considered with a 
finite set (N) of players and their characteristic 
function v, denoting the worth of a coalition S (group 
of players). Mathematically the characteristic function 
v(S), is given as
27
: 
𝑣 𝑆 =  𝑆  
1−𝐻  max ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆   𝑃𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑗  
𝐶𝑆 (𝑗 )
𝑀
𝑗=1 ... (4) 
where, S is coalition with any finite set of players 
{1,2,.., M }, |S| represents the cardinality of the set 
S, and CS(j) is the total number of entities sensing 
channel j, and Dj is the spectrum decision for channel 
j (+1 when PU present and -1 when PU absent).  
A reward is jointly assigned to each SU according 
to his effort done in reducing the uncertainty about 
PU’s activity. Since there is no priori information 
about PU’s activity, it is assumed to be random, 
thus, the probability of deciding that the PU is active 
is 0.5. Binary entropy function H(.) measures the 
amount of uncertainty associated with detection 
probabilities. Thus the uncertainty associated with 
PU’s activity before sensing the channel is at its 
maximum with a value of H(0.5) = 1. This reduction 
in uncertainty quantified as reward or worth of SUi, 
denoted as characteristic function v(i) is given as
27
: 
 v(i) = 1 – H(pij) ... (5) 
where, Pij is the probability of detecting PU by SUi on 
channel j.  
An allocation (x1, x2, ....xn) is called to be in the 
core of the game if it is found to be individually 
rational and efficient for each and every subset 
(coalition) S of N. A coalitional game with 
transferable pay-off i.e. transferable utility (TU) 
has a non-empty core only if it is balanced. 
Allocation in the core is obtained by means of 
bargaining among players. When there are many 
players in a game, it becomes tedious to solve for 
the system of inequalities and find a solution 
through bargaining. The Shapley value is a one-
point-solution that has been introduced in 
cooperative game to arrive at fair allocation ratio 
without solving the core. This singleton solution 
provides payoffs to SUs which can be used as 
currency in the allocation process to access the 
unoccupied channel. For any coalitional TU game 








i Si R    for each 𝑖 ∈ N ... (6) 
where, R is the set of all the  𝑁 ! orderings of N, 𝜇𝑖  is
the marginal contribution of user i in a coalition S and 
𝑆𝑖 𝑅  is the set of players preceding player i in the
ordering R.  
Now, using the payoff values from (6), SUs 
purchase the rights to access the unoccupied channel 
through auctioning
32
. The Vickrey-auction is a second 
price sealed-bid auction in which bidder who wins the 
auction, pays the amount of the second highest bid. 
Vickrey auction design merged with Clarke-Groves 
design for multiple units, referred as Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction mechanism, claims to facilitate 
feasible scheduling to allocate the idle channels to SUs 
based on their channel conditions, payoffs and data rate 
requirements
27
. The highest bidding SU is allocated a 
channel that is best for him (in terms of channel 
capacity) and is charged a price equal to the second 
highest bid plus a bid increment. This price is now 
subtracted from the bid of SU who was just allocated 
the channel and bids from SUs are rearranged to 
allocate remaining idle channels in a similar manner. 
VCG auction maximizes total utilities of all SUs and is 
hence considered to be socially optimal.  
3 Experimental validations on WARP 
All simulated operations between transmitter and 
receiver i.e. modulation, energy detection, power 
spectral density detection and allocation are done 
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using MATLAB-2018b and Xilinx iMPACT. The 
Shapley values are computed using TUGlab toolbox 
(Transferable Utility Games laboratory)
33
.  
The hardware setup is as shown in Fig. 2. Wireless 
Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) boards 
(Mango Communications, USA) fitted with RF 
module (2.4/5 GHz), ADC/DAC card and v3 
Virtex-6 board on a common platform are used. 
The transmitter antenna is connected to transmitter 
board and the receiver antenna is connected to 
receiver board. The transmitting WARP node, 
receiving WARP node and host PC with WARP Lab7 
and simulation software are connected to a 
common Ethernet switch (1Gbps) to establish the 
communication link. Transmission and Reception of 
the signal are performed wirelessly. Software defined 
radio (SDR) based WARP board, has a reconfigurable 
field programmable gate array (FPGA) for performing 
signal processing applications
34
. It supports different 
radio boards at the front end. The WARP FPGA 
board and radio board performs baseband processing 
and converts the intermediate frequency (IF) to analog 
radio frequency (RF) signal with specified centre 
frequency. The RF antenna radiates the RF signal.  
A cognitive radio environment is modelled with a 
set of five users wherein two users (PU1, PU2) are 
assigned as primary users and three users (SU1, SU2 
and SU3) are assigned as secondary users (i.e. 
cognitive user) which are spatially distributed over 
available spectral band of 5MHz. The SUs intend to 
follow the decentralized cooperative approach and 
access the unused licensed spectral band using 
cooperative game model. Probability of detecting the 
PU signal is computed using test statistics of energy 
detector for 1000 iterations. Simulation parameters 
are included in Table 1. The transmitted signal 
obtained from transmitter node is modulated into a 
Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) signal which is 
passed through Additive White Gaussian Noise 
(AWGN) test channel. The received signal is passed 
through the energy detection block. The power 
spectral density (PSD) output of received signal is 
used to monitor the spectral environment about the 
occupied and vacant spectrum slots using NP 
hypothesis. Allocation by OSA approach is compared 
with cooperative game approach using Shapley values 
Fig. 2 — Experimental Setup 
Table 1 — Simulation parameters. 
Carrier Frequency 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 MHz 
Sampling frequency 12 , MHz 
SNR, dB −30, −20, −10, 0, 10
Threshold, λ 1.0266 at PFA = 0.05 and  SNR = 10 db 
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for VCG auctioning. Steps followed to achieve 
the proposed objective are illustrated as flow chart 
(Fig. 3). Performance analysis of system is carried in 
terms of PD, PFA and the time consumed in sensing-
cum-allocation jointly, so as to evaluate the system’s 
efficiency towards accuracy and time available for 
SU’s to access the vacant slot.  
4 Results and Discussion 
The effect of noise on the performance of energy 
detector is recorded. Figure 4 shows periodogram 
obtained for BPSK modulated signal in AWGN 
channel at different SNR values (-30,-20 and 0 dB). It 
is evident from periodogram that, at very low SNR 
channels are unable to sense the received signal due to 
very high noise. Resolution of received signal as busy 
or idle slots (i.e. spectrum hole) starts improving on 
increasing the SNR to 0 dB and above. Thus 
probability of detection (PD) for spectrum hole 
increased with increasing SNR and reached unity at 
SNR −5 dB and above. These results are in 
concordance with earlier reported sensing studies 
based on energy detection
31
.  
For allocation of idle spectrum to SUs, the 
cognitive radio system continuously monitors for 
spectrum hole through PSD estimates as periodogram 
and Welch periodogram obtained in energy detection 
method. Energy of occupied channel/slot is compared 
with that of free channel. The higher frequency peaks 
in periodogram and corresponding sharper peaks in 
the respective Welch periodogram then that of the 
threshold value are marked as the occupied or 
allocated channel and the lower frequency peaks are 
indicative of idle/ free channel designated as spectrum 
holes (Fig. 5). It is evident that Welch method revealed 
well resolved periodogram with high contrast and higher 
difference in the spectral power density of the occupied 
and free band as compared to periodogram method.  Fig. 3 — Spectrum Sharing Model 
Fig. 4 — Periodogram showing PSD estimate of BPSK modulated signal transmitting in AWGN channel at SNR −30 dB, −20 dB and 0 dB. 
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It is assumed that the primary user, PU1 and PU2 




 slot referred as channel CH1
and CH5, rest of the slots/channels are unoccupied, 
this stage is depicts in curve A, Fig. 5. Now the 
communication system will look for the first available  







 as channel CH2, CH3 and CH4 are
identified as spectrum holes where no activity of PU 
is recorded, confirming that PU is absent. The first 
available spectral gap is occupied by the SU1 
resulting is an increase in power of CH2 (curve B, 
Fig. 5). Now the system will again search for the 
Fig. 5 — Periodogram and Welch curves showing slot allocation position multiple slots. (A): PU1, PU2; (B): PU1, PU2, SU1; (C): PU1, 
PU2, SU1, SU2; (D): PU1, PU2, SU1, SU2, SU3.  
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next spectrum hole and automatically assign CH3 to 
SU2 (curve C, Fig.5) and finally the allotment of 
4
th
 slot as CH4 to SU3 is evident in curve D, Fig. 5. 
Once all the slots are being assigned, the system will 
not entertain other secondary users. This first-come-
first serve basis spectrum allocation is opportunistic 
spectrum access (OSA) approach of spectrum sharing. 
Thus spectrum sharing in CRNs is demonstrated 
successfully without interfering with the frequency 
bands used by the licensed PUs. 
To illustrate the joint approach for spectrum sharing 
as cooperative game in CR networks, a scenario is 
consider where three secondary users SU1, SU2 and SU3 
wish to cooperate and share the idle channels of licensed 
band subdivided into five channels CH1, CH2, CH3, CH4, 
CH5 and assuming there is no priori information about 
primary user’s activity. A decentralized cooperative 
sensing approach is used where a fusion centre (FC) 
manages the sensing and access policy of SUs through a 
common control channel. For convenience, we assume 
the first SU to enter the network as the FC. Detection 
probability using Neyman–Pearson detection strategy 
from each SU is combined at FC. SUs sense the 
channels and translate SNRs to probability of detecting 
PU under a fixed probability of false alarm PFA = 0.05; 
the results of present simulations as shown in Fig. 6a. 
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots 
showing PD vs PFA for energy detector at 10dB SNR is 
shown in Fig. 6b. 
Table 2 includes spectrum sensing map, SNR 
values, probability detection PD matrix for SUs and 
PUS and decision about the occupancy state of 
channels. Spectrum sensing map is created by FC 
shows the channel occupancy by SUs. A SNR matrix 
has been created for the channels that are sensed by 
SUs; the SNR values are collected from random 
uniformly distributed variable between −30dB to 10 
dB. Now, the SNR matrix is translated into probability 
of detection for SUs using equation (2) at constant PFA.
For PUs the PD is taken as 0.5, since in the absence of 
any prior knowledge about PU’s activity, it is assumed 
to be random (refer section 2.2). The PD matrix of SUs 
and PUs is sent to FC, where they are combined to give 
decision about the idle channel. A standard simplistic 
assumption of equal gains combining fusion rule is 
adopted by FC. The decision about presence of PU 
is denoted by +1, whereas absence of PU is denoted 
by −1 as shown in Table 2. The transmission 
requirements of the SUs are quantified in terms of 
data rates or channel capacity. The channel capacity 
of a 5MHz bandwidth for AWGN channel with SNR 
values drawn from a uniform distribution between -30 
dB and 10 dB is estimated using Shannon's capacity 
formula and the values are included in Table 3. SUs 
Fig. 6 — a. PD of PU vs SNR at constant PFA (=0.05) and b. ROC Curve PD vs PFA at SNR 10dB 
Table 2 — Simulation results: Sensing Map, SNR matrix by SUs, PD values and decision on idle channel. 
Sensing Map SNR Matrix PD Matrix 
Channel→ 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 SU1 ○ ● ● ● ○ - -20 -12 -15 - 0.5 0.3565 0.7788 0.5430 0.5 
 SU2 ○ ● ● ○ ○ - -17 -09 - - 0.5 0.4390 0.9757 0.5000 0.5 
 SU3 ○ ● ○ ○ ○ - -22 - - - 0.5 0.3160 0.5000 0.5000 0.5 
 Decision → −1 +1 +1 +1 −1
'○' represents occupied channel and ‘●’ represents idle channel 
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choose the channels they prefer to sense according to 
their data rate requirements.  
The characteristic function of cooperative game 
based on reduction on uncertainty about PU’s 
activity is then calculated using equation (4). The 
reward that a SU acquires from sensing the 
channel is quantified from reduction in uncertainty 
about PU’s activity, computed using equation (5). 
The rewards of SU for present simulation in 
presence and absence of PU are shown in Fig. 7 
Each SU receives a reward for its effort done 
in the sensing process. The rewards acquired are 
the worth of SUs that are being used to calculate 
the payoffs using one-point solutions based on 
Shapley values. The payoff values of respective SUs 
as per equation (6) are: 39.1600 (SU1), 28.6667 
(SU2) and 32.1667 (SU3). These payoff values, 
included in Table 3(b) are used as currency during 
bidding for channel access and reflect SU’s 
expectations based on their transmission needs. 
Results are in concordance with the simulations 
carried out in reference
27
. 
Channel allocation based on VCG auction 
mechanism has been carried out. According to the 
payoff values, SU2 has the highest bid and the best 
unoccupied channel for SU2 in terms of obtainable 
data rate is channel CH4. Thus in first round of 
bidding, SU2 gets access to channel CH4 at the price 
of second highest bidder (i.e. of SU3) plus one bid 
increment i.e. a price of 18.9212. Now for second 
round of bidding, the bid of SU1 and SU3 are restored 
whereas for SU2, the price paid in first round is 
deducted from the bid and the new bid for is obtained 
and auction is continued. Now SU3 is the highest 
bidder and best channel for her is channel CH3. SU3 
pays a price of 12.7612 to get access to channel CH3. 
The same process is repeated for third round of 
bidding and SU1 get access to channel CH2 for a price 
of 6.7401. The final allocation is shown in Table 3. 
VCG auction does not guarantee data rate 
maximization; however the resources allocated in 
first round are deducted from the bid and the new 
bid of SU2 is obtained. Bids are sorted again and 
auction is continued. The SU3 is now the highest 
bidder and the best unoccupied channel is CH3. SU1 
is the second according to SU bids and hence satisfy 
the data rate requirements of the SUs in a fair 
manner. The allocation time for opportunistic 
spectrum access (OSA) approach is as computed to 
be 122 ms and that of dynamic spectrum access 
(DSA) using cooperative game theoretic model 
with Shapley values for VCG auction is 107ms. 
The later approach has shown to consume less 
time; as a result more number of users can share the 
channel. Thus the allocation under cooperative game 
is considered to be spectrum efficient as all the 
channels are occupied at any given time, leaving no 
idle channels with minimum allocation time.  
5 Conclusions 
A MATLAB based simulation has been carried 
out for cognitive radio based joint framework for 
Table 3 — Channel capacity and channel allocation based on 
VCG auction. 
 User → SU1 SU2 SU3 
a. Channel Capacity (Mbps)
CH2 0.9930 0.0687 0.8485 
CH3 0.0243 0.0535 0.9998 
CH4 1.6465 0.7218 0.0618 
b. Channel Allocation
Payoffs* 39.1600 28.6667 32.1667 
c. First round of bidding
SU’s Bids 12.7611 25.6612 18.9211 
Price paid -- 18.9212 -- 
Channel allocated -- # CH4 -- 
Data rate achieved, Mbps -- 0.7218 -- 
d. Second round of bidding
Bids 12.7611 6.7400 18.9211 
Price paid -- -- 12.7612 
Channel allocated -- -- # CH3 
Data Rate achieved, Mbps -- -- 0.9998 
e. Second round of bidding
Bids 12.7611 6.7400 6.1599 
Price paid 7.7400 -- -- 
Channel allocated # CH2 -- -- 
Data Rate achieved, Mbps 0.9930 
Balance Payoffs 31.4200 9.7455 19.4055 
*as per Shapley value
Fig. 7 — Reward for SU based on reduction of uncertainty about 
PU’s activity  
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spectrum sharing wherein spectrum sensing follows 
a decentralised cooperative approach and spectrum 
access strategies are based on a cooperative game 
for their real time implementation on WARP. 
Energy detection by periodogram and Welch 
method to provided the PSD estimates for spectrum 
sensing and monitoring spectrum holes. The 
cooperative game (CG) model has shown to 
provide SUs with an incentive to cooperate. 
Based on their worth, SUs get payoffs which 
were computed using Shapely values as one-point 
solutions and allocation through a Vickrey–Clarke–
Groves auction mechanism. This mechanism 
allocates the best possible channels to SUs 
according to their bids and hence satisfies their 
data rate requirements in a fair manner. The 
algorithm exhibit superior performance in terms of 
reduced sensing time and allocation time resulting in 
a spectrum efficient communication system as 
channel can be shared by more number of users. It is 
envisaged to extend the proposed spectrum sharing 
model for complex spectrum sharing systems, 
taking into account of more parameters like 
interference management and energy efficiency in a 
heterogeneous cognitive environment.  
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